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Abstract
We study network coordination problems, as captured by the setting of generalized network design
(Emek et al., STOC 2018), in the face of uncertainty resulting from partial information that the
network users hold regarding the actions of their peers. This uncertainty is formalized using Alon
et al.’s Bayesian ignorance framework (TCS 2012). While the approach of Alon et al. is purely
combinatorial, the current paper takes into account computational considerations: Our main technical
contribution is the development of (strongly) polynomial time algorithms for local decision making
in the face of Bayesian uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
In real-life situations, network users are often required to coordinate actions for perfor-
mance optimization. This challenging coordination task becomes even harder in the face
of uncertainty, as users often act with partial information regarding their peers. Can users
overcome their local views and reach a good global outcome? How far would this outcome
be from optimal?
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For a formal treatment of the aforementioned questions, we adopt the Bayesian ignorance
framework of Alon et al. [4]. Consider N agents in a routing scenario, where each agent
i ∈ [N ] should decide on a (ui, vi)-path ai in the network with the objective of minimizing
some global cost function that depends on the links’ load. The (ui, vi) pair, also referred to
as the type of agent i, is drawn from a distribution pi. All agents know this distribution, but
the actual realization (ui, vi) of each agent i is only known to i herself.
Our goal is to construct a strategy for each agent i that determines her action ai based
only on her individual type (ui, vi). These strategies are computed in a “preprocessing stage”
and the actual decision making happens in real-time without further communication. We
measure the quality of a tuple of strategies in terms of its Bayesian competitive ratio (BCR)
defined as the ratio of the expected cost obtained by these strategies to that of an optimal
solution computed by an omnipotent algorithm (refer to Sec. 1.1.1 for the exact definition).
To the best of our knowledge, this algorithmic evaluation measure has not been studied so far.
Our main technical contribution is a generic framework that yields strongly polynomial-
time algorithms constructing agent strategies with low BCR for Bayesian generalized network
design (BGND) problems – a setting that includes routing and many other network coordi-
nation problems. Our framework assumes cost functions that exhibit diseconomy of scale
(DoS) [5, 6, 28], capturing the power consumption of devices that employ the popular speed
scaling technique.
1.1 Model
For clarity of the exposition, we start with the special case of Bayesian routing in Sec. 1.1.1 and
then present the more general BGND setting in Sec. 1.1.2. Conceptually, the new algorithmic
problem of Bayesian routing that we define here is related to oblivious routing [21, 17, 35],
where routing requests should be performed without any knowledge about actual network
traffic. This means that the routing path chosen for a routing request may only depend
on the network structure and the other parameters of the problem. Oblivious algorithms
are attractive as they can be implemented very efficiently in a distributed environment as
they base routing decisions only on local knowledge. As will become formally clear below,
Bayesian routing has a similar flavor, but with an important additional ingredient. We will
assume that the algorithm is equipped with statistical (“Bayesian”) knowledge about network
traffic. Thus, in a sense, we replace internal randomization techniques, that oblivious routing
usually employs, with actual data, while still being oblivious to other actual routing decisions
and thus still maintaining the locality principle.1
1.1.1 Special Case: Bayesian Routing
In the full information variant of the routing problem, we are given a (directed or undirected)
graph G = (V,E) and a set of N agents, where each agent i ∈ [N ] is associated with a node
pair (ui, vi) ∈ V × V , referred to as the (routing) request of agent i. This request should be
satisfied by choosing some (ui, vi)-path in G, referred to as the (feasible) action of agent i,
and the collection of all such paths is denoted by Ai.
1 This is different from stochastic network design as these algorithms are not oblivious. More details are
given below.
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Let A = A1 × · · · ×AN be the collection of all action profiles. The load on edge e ∈ E
with respect to action profile a ∈ A, denoted by lae , is defined to be the number of agents
whose actions include e, that is, lae = |{i ∈ [N ] : e ∈ ai}|. The cost incurred by load lae on
edge e is determined by an (edge specific) superadditive cost function Fe : R≥0 7→ R≥0 such
that for any l ≥ 0,
Fe(l) = ξe · lα , (1)
where ξe > 0 (a.k.a. the speed scaling factor) is a parameter of edge e and α > 1 (a.k.a. the
load exponent) is a global constant parameter. Such a superadditive cost function captures,
for example, the power consumption of network devices employing the popular speed scaling
technique [37, 25, 7, 29, 12, 3] that allows the device to adapt its power level to its actual
load. In particular, for those network devices that employ the speed scaling technique, the
value of α generally satisfies 1 < α ≤ 3 [24, 36]. Another application of the cost function (1)
with α = 2 is to model the queuing delay of users in a TCP/IP communication networks [18].
The goal in the (full information) routing problem is to construct an action profile a ∈ A
with the objective of minimizing the total cost C(a) =
∑
e∈E Fe(lae ).
1.1.1.1 Extending to Partial Information
In the current paper, we extend the full information routing problem to the Bayesian routing
problem, where the request of agent i ∈ [N ] is not fully known to all other agents. In this
problem variant, agent i ∈ [N ] is associated with a set Ti of types so that each type ti ∈ Ti
specifies its own routing request (utii , v
ti
i ) ∈ V ×V . Let Atii be the set of all (feasible) actions
for (the request of) type ti, namely, all (utii , v
ti
i )-paths in G and let Ai =
⋃
ti∈Ti A
ti
i .
Agent i is also associated with a prior distribution pi over the types in Ti and the crux of
the Bayesian routing problem is that agent i should decide on her action while knowing the
realization of her own prior distribution pi (that is, the routing request she should satisfy)
but without knowing the realizations of the prior distributions of the other agents j 6= i.
Formally, let T = T1 × · · · × TN be the collection of type profiles and A = A1 × · · · ×AN be
the collection of action profiles. The set of (feasible) action profiles for a type profile t ∈ T is
denoted by At = At11 × · · · × AtNN and the prior distribution over the type profiles in T is
denoted by p. In this paper, p is assumed to be a product distribution, i.e., the probability
of type profile t ∈ T is p(t) = ∏Ni=1 pi(ti).
The goal in the Bayesian routing problem is to construct for each agent i ∈ [N ], a strategy
si : Ti 7→ Ai that maps agent i’s realized type ti ∈ Ti to an action ai ∈ Atii . We emphasize
that the decision of agent i is taken irrespective of the other agents’ realized types which
are not (fully) known to agent i. Intuitively, a strategy si can be viewed as a lookup table
constructed in the “preprocessing stage”, and queried at real-time to determine a (fixed)
path for every (ui, vi) pair associated with i (cf. oblivious routing [30, 35]).
The set of strategies available for agent i is denoted by Si and S = S1× · · · ×SN denotes
the set of strategy profiles. For each type profile t ∈ T , the strategy profile s ∈ S determines
an action profile a = s(t) ∈ A defined so that ai = si(ti), i ∈ [N ]. Using this notation,
the objective in the Bayesian routing problem is to construct a strategy profile s ∈ S that
minimizes the total cost C(s) = Et∼p
[∑
e∈E Fe
(
l
s(t)
e
)]
.
1.1.1.2 Bayesian Competitive Ratio
Consider an algorithm A that given a Bayesian routing instance, constructs a strategy profile
s. To evaluate the performance of A, we compare the total cost C(s) to Et∼p[OPT(t)], where
OPT(t) = mina∈At
∑
e∈E Fe(lae ) is the cost of an optimal action profile for the type profile
t ∈ T . This can be regarded as the expectation, over the same prior distribution p, of the
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total cost incurred by an omnipotent algorithm that has a global view of the whole type
profile t and enjoys unlimited computational resources. The Bayesian competitive ratio
(BCR) of algorithm A is the smallest β ≥ 1 such that for every Bayesian routing instance,
the strategy profile s constructed by A satisfies C(s) ≤ β · Et∼p[OPT(t)].
Alon et al. [4] introduced the related criterion of Bayesian ignorance defined as C(s
∗)
Et∼p[OPT(t)] ,
where s∗ = argmins∈S C(s) is an optimal strategy profile for the given instance. This crite-
rion quantifies the implication of the agents’ partial knowledge regarding the global system
configuration, irrespective of the computational complexity of constructing this optimal
strategy profile. By definition, for any strategy profile s ∈ S, C(s) = Et∼p
[∑
e∈E Fe
(
l
s(t)
e
)] ≥
Et∼p
[
mina∈At
∑
e∈E Fe(lae )
]
, which implies that the Bayesian ignorance is at least 1. Notice
that the BCR is equivalent to the product of the approximation ratio C(s)C(s∗) and the Bayesian
ignorance, therefore it evaluates the loss caused by both algorithmic (computational com-
plexity) considerations and the absence of the global information. The first contribution of
the current paper is cast in the following theorem.
I Theorem 1. For the Bayesian routing problem, there exists an algorithm whose BCR
depends only on the load exponent parameter α. This algorithm is fully combinatorial and
runs in strongly polynomial time.
We emphasize that the BCR of the algorithm promised in Theorem 1 is independent of
the number of agents N , the underlying graph G, the speed scaling factors ξe, e ∈ E, and
the probability distribution p. Therefore, as α is assumed to be a constant, so is the BCR.
1.1.2 Bayesian Generalized Network Design
1.1.2.1 Generalized Network Design
The (full information) routing problem has recently been generalized by Emek et al. [15]
to the wider family of generalized network design (GND) problems. In its full information
form (the form considered in [15]), a GND instance is defined over N agents and a set E of
resources. Each agent i ∈ [N ] is associated with an abstract (not necessarily routing) request
characterized by a set Ai ⊆ 2E of (feasible) actions out of which , some action ai ∈ Ai
should be selected. As in the routing case, the action profile a = (a1, . . . , aN ) induces a
load of lae = |{i ∈ [N ] : e ∈ ai}| on each resource e ∈ E that subsequently incurs a cost of
Fe(lae ), where Fe : R≥0 7→ R≥0 is a resource specific cost function. The goal is to construct
an action profile a ∈ A = A1 × · · · × AN with the objective of minimizing the total cost
C(a) =
∑
e∈E Fe(lae ).
The request of agent i ∈ [N ] is said to be succinctly represented [15] if its corresponding
action set Ai can be encoded using poly(|E|) bits. Identifying the resource set E with the
edge set of an underlying graph G, the routing requests defined in Sec. 1.1.1 are clearly
succinctly represented since each Ai corresponds to the set of (ui, vi)-paths in G, hence Ai
can be encoded by specifying ui and vi (and G). Other examples for succinctly represented
requests, where the resource set E is identified with the edge set of an underlying (directed
or undirected) graph G = (V,E), include:
multi-routing requests in directed or undirected graphs, where given a collection Di ⊆
V × V of terminal pairs, the action set Ai consists of all edge subsets F ⊆ E such that
the subgraph (V, F ) admits a (u, v)-path for every (u, v) ∈ Di; and
set connectivity (resp., set strong connectivity) in undirected (resp., directed) graphs,
where given a set Ti ⊆ V of terminals, the action set Ai consists of all edge subsets F ⊆ E
that induce on G a connected (resp., strongly connected) subgraph that spans Ti.
All requests mentioned (implicitly or explicitly) hereafter are assumed to be succinctly
represented.
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1.1.2.2 Bayesian GND
In the current paper, we extend the (full information) GND setting to Bayesian GND
(BGND). This extension is analogous to the extension of full information routing to Bayesian
routing as defined in Sec. 1.1.1. In particular, agent i ∈ [N ] is now associated with a set Ti
of types, where each type ti ∈ Ti corresponds to a request whose action set is denoted by
Atii , and a prior distribution pi over the types in Ti. A strategy si of agent i is a function
that maps the agent’s realized type ti ∈ Ti to an action si(ti) ∈ Atii .
Similarly to the notation introduced in Sec. 1.1.1, let T = T1 × · · · × TN be the set of
type profiles. Let Ai =
⋃
ti∈Ti A
ti
i and let A = A1 × · · · × AN be the set of action profiles.
Let Si be the set of strategies available for agent i and let S = S1 × · · · × SN be the set of
strategy profiles. Given a strategy profile s ∈ S and a type profile t ∈ T , let a = s(t) ∈ A be
the action profile defined so that ai = si(ti), i ∈ [N ]. The goal in the BGND problem is to
construct a strategy profile s ∈ S with the objective of minimizing the total cost
C(s) = Et∼p
[∑
e∈E
Fe
(
ls(t)e
)]
. (2)
The BCR of Algorithm A is the smallest β ≥ 1 such that for every BGND instance, the
strategy profile s ∈ S constructed by A satisfies C(s) ≤ β · Et∼p[OPT(t)], where OPT(t) =
mina∈At
∑
e∈E Fe(lae ) .
1.1.2.3 Generalized Cost Functions
In addition to the generalization of (full information) routing to GND, [15] also generalizes
the cost functions defined in Eq. (1) to cost functions of the form
Fe(l) =
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j · lαj , (3)
where q is a positive integer, ξe,j is a positive real for every e ∈ E and j ∈ [q], and αj is
a constant real no smaller than 1 for every j ∈ [q].2 We define αmax = maxj∈[q] αj and
assume hereafter that αmax > 1. As discussed in [15], this generalization of Eq. (3) is not
only interesting from a theoretical perspective, but also makes the model more applicable to
practical network energy saving applications. Indeed, in realistic communication networks, a
link often consists of several different devices (e.g., transmitter/receiver, amplifier, adapter),
all of which are operating when the link is in use. As their energy consumption can vary in
terms of the load exponents and speed scaling factors [36], Eq. (3) may often provide a more
accurate abstraction of the actual link’s power consumption.
1.1.2.4 Action Oracles
For a BGND problem P, this paper develops a framework which generates an algorithm
with BCR O(%αmax) when provided with an action %-oracle for P. An action %-oracle with
parameter % ≥ 1 for BGND problem P (cf. the reply %-oracles of [15]) is a procedure that
given agent i ∈ [N ], type ti ∈ Ti, and a weight vector w ∈ RE≥0, generates an action ai ∈ Atii
such that
∑
e∈ai w(e) ≤ % ·
∑
e∈a′
i
w(e) for any action a′i ∈ Atii . An exact action oracle is an
action %-oracle with parameter % = 1.
2 The cost functions considered in [15] have a fixed additional term, capturing the resource’s startup cost,
that makes them even more general. Due to technical difficulties, in the current paper we were not able
to cope with this additional term.
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Notice that the optimization problem behind the action oracle is not a BGND problem:
It deals with a single type of a single agent and the role of the resource cost functions is now
taken by the weight vector. These differences often make it possible to implement the action
oracle with known (approximation) algorithms.
For example, the Bayesian routing problem, which requires paths between the given node
pairs, admit an exact action oracle implemented using, e.g., Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm
[14, 19]. In contrast, the BGND problem with set connectivity requests in undirected graphs
(P1), the BGND problem with set strong connectivity requests in directed graphs (P2),
the BGND problem with multi-routing requests in undirected graphs (P3), and the BGND
problem with multi-routing requests in directed graphs (P4) do not admit exact action
oracles unless P = NP as these would imply exact (efficient) algorithms for the Steiner tree,
strongly connected Steiner subgraph, Steiner forest, and directed Steiner forest problems,
respectively. However, employing known approximation algorithms for the latter (Steiner)
problems, one concludes that BGND problem (P1) admits an action %-oracle for % ≤ 1.39
[9]; BGND problem (P2) admits an action ν-oracle, where ν is the number of terminals
[10]; BGND problem (P3) admits an action 2-oracle [1]; and BGND problem (P4) admits
an action k1/2+-oracle, where k is the number of terminal pairs [11]. This means, in
particular, that BGND problems (P1) and (P3) always admit an action %-oracle with a
constant approximation ratio %, whereas BGND problems (P2) and (P4) admit such an
oracle when ν and k are fixed [1, 10, 11, 9]. The guarantees of our approximation framework
are cast in the following theorem.
I Theorem 2. Consider a BGND problem P with an action %-oracle OP . When provided
access to OP , the framework proposed in this paper generates an algorithm AP whose BCR
depends only on the load exponent parameters α1, . . . , αq of Eq. (3). This framework is fully
combinatorial and runs in strongly polynomial time, hence if OP can be implemented to run
in strongly polynomial time, then so can AP .
Again, we emphasize that the BCR of the algorithm promised in Theorem 2 is independent
of the number of agents N , the number of resources |E|, the speed scaling factors ξe,j , j ∈ [q],
e ∈ E, and the probability distribution p. Therefore, as α1, . . . , αq are assumed to be
constants, so is the BCR. Since the Bayesian routing problem admits an exact action oracle,
Theorem 1 follows trivially from Theorem 2. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we
focus on the BGND framework promised in Theorem 2.
1.2 Related Works
The technical framework that we use is inspired by [15]. Sec. 3 gives a detailed technical
overview including a full comparison.
In the full information case, network design problems with superadditive cost functions
as defined in Eq. (1) have been extensively studied with the motivation of improving the
energy efficiency of networks [5, 6, 28]. To the best of our knowledge, none of these studies
has been extended to the Bayesian case.
In the research works on oblivious routing (e.g., [17, 35, 27, 23]), the absence of global
information in routing is modeled in an adversarial (non-Bayesian) manner. In particular,
oblivious routing assumes that no knowledge about t−i is available when determining every
ai, and the performance of the algorithm is evaluated by means of its competitive ratio
maxt∈T
∑
e∈E Fe(l
s(t)
e )
OPT(t) . For the cost function Fe(l) = lα with α > 1, Englert and Räcke [17]
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propose an O(logα |V |)-competitive oblivious routing algorithm for the scenario where the
traffic requests are allowed to be partitioned into fractional flows. Shi et al. [35] prove that
for such a cost function, there exists no oblivious routing algorithm with competitive ratio
O
(
|E|α−1α+1
)
when it is required to choose an integral path for every request.
The Bayesian approach is often used in the game theoretic literature to model the uncer-
tainty a player experiences regarding the actions taken by the other players. Roughgarden
[32] studies a routing game (among other things) in which the players share (equally) the
cost of the edges they use and proposes a theoretical tool called smoothness to analyze the
price of anarchy (PoA) of this game in a Bayesian setting, defined as maxs∈SBNE C(s)Et∼p[OPT(t)] , where
SBNE denotes the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria. In particular, he proves that with the cost
function Fe(l) = ξe,1 · l + ξe,2 · l2, the PoA is bounded by 52 . We employ the smoothness
toolbox in our algorithmic construction, as further described in Sec. 5 (see also the overview
in Sec. 3, as well as the detail in Sec. 6 of the full version [16]).
Alon et al. [4] investigate the Bayesian routing game with a constant cost function Fe = ξe
and prove that the Bayesian ignorance C(s
∗)
Et∼p[OPT(t)] is bounded by O(N) (resp., O(log |E|)) in
directed (resp., undirected) graphs G = (V,E). They also introduce game theoretic variants
of the Bayesian ignorance notion and analyze them in that game.
To deal with the inherent uncertainty of the demand in realistic networks, many research
works have been conducted on stochastic network design [22, 13, 31], formulated as a two-stage
stochastic optimization problem: in the first stage, each link in the network has a fixed
cost and the algorithm needs to make decisions to purchase links knowing the probability
distribution over the network demands; in the second stage, the network demands are realized
(according to the aforementioned probability distribution) and should be satisfied, which
may require purchasing additional links, this time with an inflated cost. The objective is to
minimize the total cost of the two stages plus a load dependent term, in expectation.
The BGND setting considered in the current paper is different from two-stage stochastic
optimization (particularly, stochastic network design) in several aspects, the most significant
one is that in BGND, an agent’s strategy should dictate her “complete action” (e.g., a path
for routing requests) for every possible type, obliviously of the realized types of the other
agents. In particular, one cannot “update” the agents’ actions and purchase additional
resources at a later stage to satisfy the realized demands. Moreover, the current paper
evaluates the performance of a BGND algorithm by means of its BCR that takes into
consideration computational complexity limitations as well as the lack of global information
(see Sec. 1.1) whereas the literature on two-stage stochastic optimization typically evaluates
algorithms using standard approximation guarantees that accounts only for computational
complexity limitations.
In [20], Garg et al. investigate online combinatorial optimization problems where the
requests arriving online are drawn independently and identically from a known distribution.
As an example, Garg et al. [20] study the online Steiner tree problem on an undirected graph
G = (V,E). In this problem, at each step the algorithm receives a terminal that is drawn
independently from a distribution over V , and needs to maintain a subset of edges connecting
all the terminals received so far.
Our work differs from [20] in following four aspects. First, in the stochastic online
optimization problem studied in [20], when each request i arrives, the previous requests
{1, · · · , i− 1} have been realized, and the realization is known. By contrast, in the BGND
problem, every agent i needs to be served without knowing the actual realization of the other
agents. Second, the cost function studied in [20] maps each resource e to a fixed toll, which
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is subaddtive in the number of requests using e, while our cost function is superaddtive.
Third, in the BGND problem with the set connectivity requests, for each agent i, each type
ti is a set of terminals rather than a single terminal, and each action in Atii is a Steiner tree
spanning over the set of terminals corresponding to ti. Fourth, in the BGND problem, each
prior distribution pi is over the types of agent i, while there is no distribution over the agents.
1.3 Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces some of the concepts
employed in our approximation framework together with some notation and terminology.
The main challenges that we had to overcome when developing this framework and some of
the techniques used for that purpose are discussed in Sec. 3. Sec. 4 is dedicated to a detailed
exposition of our approximation framework. Its performance is then analyzed in Sec. 5 using
certain game theoretic properties.
2 Preliminaries
We follow the common convention that for an N -tuple x = (x1, . . . , xN ) and for i ∈ [N ], the
notation x−i denotes the (N−1)-tuple (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ). Likewise, for a Cartesian
product X = X1×· · ·×XN and for i ∈ [N ], the notation X−i denotes the Cartesian product
X1 × · · · ×Xi−1 ×Xi+1 × · · · ×XN .
2.1 The BGND Game
Given an instance I = 〈N,E, {Ti, pi}i∈[N ], {ξe,j}e∈E,j∈[q], {αj}j∈[q]〉 of a BGND problem P ,
we define a BGND game by associating every agent i ∈ [N ] with a strategic player who
decides on the strategy si with the objective of minimizing her own individual cost defined
as follows. Given an action profile a ∈ A and a resource e ∈ E, the corresponding cost Fe(lae )
is equally divided among the players i ∈ [N ] satisfying e ∈ ai; in other words, the cost share
of player i in resource e under action profile a, denoted by fi,e(a), is defined to be
fi,e(a) =
{
0 , e /∈ ai
Fe(lae )
|i:e∈ai| =
∑
j ξe,j (lae )
αj−1 , otherwise
.
Informally, the individual cost of player i is the sum of her cost shares over all resources.
For a more formal treatment of the BGND game, we occasionally need to explicitly
specify the type ti of player i in the expressions involving her cost share in which case we
use the notation fi,e(ti; a), following the convention that fi,e(ti; a) = fi,e(a) if ai ∈ Atii ;
and fi,e(ti; a) =∞ otherwise. The individual cost of a player i with respect to the type ti
and a fixed action profile a is defined as Ci(ti; a) =
∑
e∈E fi,e(ti; a). Correspondingly, for
each player i ∈ [N ] and each type ti ∈ Ti, we define the type-specified expected individual
cost Ci(ti; s) = Et−i∼p−i
[
Ci(ti; s(ti, t−i))
]
. The objective function that player i wishes to
minimize is her type-averaged expected individual cost Ci(s) = Eti∼pi
[
Ci(ti; s)
]
, irrespective
of the total cost C(s), often referred to as the social cost.
Let fi,e(ai; s−i) = Et−i∼p−i [fi,e(ai, s−i(t−i))] be the expected cost share of player i ∈ [N ]
on resource e ∈ E with respect to action ai ∈ Ai and strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i. Fixing a−i ∈
A−i (resp., s−i ∈ S−i), the cost share fi,e(ai, a−i) (resp., expected cost share fi,e(ai; s−i)) of
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player i on resource e is the same for every action ai ∈ Ai such that e ∈ ai. Therefore, it is
often convenient to ignore the specifics of action ai and use the notations fi,e(+, a−i) and
fi,e(+; s−i) instead of fi,e(ai, a−i) and fi,e(ai; s−i), respectively, given that e ∈ ai.3
2.2 Definitions for the Algorithm Design and Analysis
The following definitions play key roles in the design and analysis of our framework.
I Definition (Choice Function [32]). A choice function σ : T 7→ A maps every type profile
t ∈ T to an action profile a ∈ At. The action specified by σ for player i ∈ [N ] with respect
to type profile t is denoted by σi(t). In particular, the choice function that maps each type
profile t to an action profile that realizes OPT(t) is denoted by σ∗.
I Definition (Smoothness [32]). Given parameters λ > 0 and 0 < µ < 1, a BGND game is
said to be (λ, µ)-smooth if
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(ti; (σ∗i (t), a−i)) ≤ λ · OPT(t) + µ ·
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(t′i, a) for every
type profiles t, t′ ∈ T and action profile a ∈ At′ .
I Definition (Potential Function). A function Φ : S 7→ R≥0 is said to be a potential function
of the BGND game if Φ(s)− Φ(s′i, s−i) = Ci(s)− Ci(s′i, s−i) for every strategy profile s ∈ S,
player i ∈ [N ], and strategy s′i ∈ Si. The potential function Φ(·) is said to be K-bounded for
a parameter K ≥ 1 if Φ(s) ≤ C(s) ≤ K · Φ(s) for every strategy profile s ∈ S.
I Definition ((η, η)-Estimation). Given real parameters η, η ≥ 1, a value x is said to be
an (η, η)-estimation of the expected cost share fi,e(ai; s−i) (resp., fi,e(+; s−i)) if it satisfies
x/η ≤ fi,e(ai; s−i) ≤ x · η (resp., x/η ≤ fi,e(+; s−i) ≤ x · η). We typically denote this
estimation x by f̂i,e(ai; s−i) (resp., f̂i,e(+; s−i)). The BGND game is said to be poly-time
(η, η)-estimable if for every player i ∈ [N ] and strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i, there exists an
algorithm which runs in time poly(N, q, |T1|, · · · , |TN |) and outputs an (η, η)-estimation of
the expected cost share fi,e(+; s−i). The BGND game is said to be tractable if it is poly-time
(η, η)-estimable with η = η = 1.
Fix some player i ∈ [N ], type ti ∈ Ti, and (η, η)-estimations f̂i,e(si(ti); s−i), e ∈
E. With respect to these variables, let Ĉi(ti; s) =
∑
e∈E f̂i,e(si(ti); s−i) and Ĉi(s) =
Eti∼pi [Ĉi(ti; s)]. By the linearity of expectation, we know that Ĉi(ti; s)/η ≤ Ci(ti; s) ≤
Ĉi(ti; s) · η and Ĉi(s)/η ≤ Ci(s) ≤ Ĉi(s) · η . Consequently, we refer to Ĉi(ti; s) and Ĉi(s) as
(η, η)-estimations of Ci(ti; s) and Ci(s), respectively.
I Definition (Approximate Best Response). For strategy profile s ∈ S and player i ∈ [N ],
strategy si ∈ Si is said to be an approximate best response (ABR) of i with approximation
parameter χ ≥ 1 if Ci(si, s−i) ≤ χ · Ci(s′i, s−i) holds for any s′i ∈ Si. We may omit the
explicit mention of the approximation parameter χ when it is clear from the context. A best
response (BR) is an ABR with approximation parameter χ = 1.
I Definition (Approximate Best Response Dynamics). An approximate best response dynamic
(ABRD) is a procedure that starts from a predetermined strategy profile s0 ∈ S and generates
a series of strategy profiles s1, · · · , sR such that for every 1 ≤ r ≤ R, there exists some player
i ∈ [N ] satisfying (1) sr−i = sr−1−i ; and (2) sri is an ABR of i to sr−1−i .
3 To avoid ambiguity concerning the definition of fi,e(+, a−i) and fi,e(+; s−i) for resources e /∈ Ai, we
assume (in the scope of using these notations) that Ai = E for all i ∈ [N ]. This is without loss of
generality as one can augment Ti with a virtual type t˜i such that At˜ii = {E} and pi(t˜i) is arbitrarily small.
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3 Overview of the Main Challenges and Techniques
The approximation framework presented in Sec. 4 for BGND problems is inspired by the
framework designed in [15] for full information GND problems only in the conceptual sense
that both algorithms employ approximate best response dynamics. In a high-level, for a
certain number R of rounds that will be carefully chosen in order to achieve the approximation
promise, and starting from some properly chosen initial strategy profile s0, for each round
1 ≤ r ≤ R the strategy profile sr is generated from sr−1 in the following manner:
1. For every player i ∈ [N ] and resource e ∈ E, compute an (η, η)-estimation f̂i,e(+; sr−1−i ) of
the expected cost share fi,e(+; sr−1−i ).
2. For every player i ∈ [N ], construct the strategy s′i by mapping each type ti ∈ Ti to the
action ai ∈ Atii computed by invoking the action %-oracle with weight vector w defined
by setting w(e) = f̂i,e(+; sr−1−i ).
3. Choose player i ∈ [N ] according to the game theoretic criterion presented in Sec. 4 regard-
ing the estimations Ĉi(sr−1) and Ĉi(s′i, sr−1−i ) of the type-averaged expected individual
costs. Construct sr by updating the strategy of the chosen player i to s′i.
However, beyond the similar high-level structure, the technical construction in this paper
is entirely different from [15] since the incomplete information assumption of the BGND
setting exhibits new algorithmic challenges that require novel techniques. Specifically, the
main challenges that our technical analysis in this paper handles are as follows.
A first obstacle here is the difficulty in computing the estimation f̂i,e(+; sr−1−i ) =
Et−i∼p−i [fi,e(+, s−i(t−i))] in step 1 since there are exponentially (in N) many possibili-
ties for t−i. Another source of difficulty in this regard is that the function fi,e(+, s−i(t−i))
is nonlinear in ls−i(t−i)e . One may hope that Jensen’s inequality [26] can resolve this issue,
however, as we explain in the technical sections, it is not enough for obtaining proper bounds
on both η and η. This obstacle is addressed in Sec. 5 (and Sec. 8 of the full version [16])
where we employ probabilistic tools from [8] and using Cantelli’s inequality [34] to obtain
the required estimation of the expression Et−i∼p−i [fi,e(+, s−i(t−i))].
A second obstacle is that the ABRD-based approximation framework expresses its
approximation guarantees in terms of smoothness parameters and bounded potential functions.
However, neither the smoothness parameters nor the existence of a bounded potential function
are known for the BGND game that we have defined here. We provide a new analysis for
these two issues in Sec. 6 and Sec. 7 of the full version [16], respectively.
A third obstacle involves the stopping condition of the best response dynamics. A stopping
condition for the full information case, via the smoothness framework, was developed by
[33] (showing that if the current outcome in a best response dynamics is far from optimal
there must exist a player whose best response significantly improves his own utility). For the
Bayesian case, to the best of our knowledge, no such general stopping condition was known
prior to the current paper. In fact, the smoothness framework for the Bayesian case which
was developed in [32] did not include any results on best response dynamics. One specific
technical difficulty is that Bayesian smoothness is defined in [32] w.r.t. a deviation to the
optimal choice function rather than to a best response. This obstacle is resolved in Sec. 5
of the full version [16] where we provide such a stopping condition by proving that if the
outcome of the current step of the ABRD in the Bayesian case is far from optimal, there
must exist a player whose approximate best response must significantly improve her utility.
A fourth obstacle regards the output of the algorithm, once the ABRD terminates.
Although we prove that there exists at least one strategy profile sr, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, with a
sufficiently small social cost C(sr), we do not know how to find it. In particular, we wish to
emphasize that we cannot simply evaluate the social cost function C(·) (see Eq. (2)) due
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to the exponential number of type profiles. This obstacle does not exist in [15] where they
can explicitly go over all steps of the full information ABRD and find the exact step whose
outcome has minimal cost. To resolve this issue, we output the last strategy profile sR
generated in the ABRD and bound its loss. This is described in Sec. 5 of the full version [16].
Our technical constructions and our analysis employ various techniques from algorithmic
game theory, demonstrating once again (as in [15]) the usefulness of this literature as a
toolbox for algorithmic constructions that, on the face of it, have nothing to do with selfish
agents. In particular, in this paper (and as assumed in the literature on oblivious routing
[21, 17, 35]), we construct an algorithm that receives a correct input and outputs routing
tables that the agents are going to follow without issues of selfish deviations.
4 The Algorithm
In this part, we present an algorithm, which is referred to as Bayes-ABRD, for a given BGND
problem P. The algorithm is assumed to have free access to an action %-oracle for P, which
is denoted by OP .
With an input instance I = 〈N,E, {Ti, pi}i∈[N ], {ξe,j}e∈E,j∈[q], {αj}j∈[q]〉, the first step of
the algorithm is to (conceptually) construct a BGND game, and choose a tuple of parameters
(λ, µ,K, η, η) such that the BGND game
1. is (λ, µ)-smooth with %(ηη)2µ < 1,
2. has a potential function Φ that is K-bounded,
3. is poly-time (η, η)-estimable.
The existence and exact values of the parameters in this tuple are presented in Sec. 5.
I Lemma 3. For any i ∈ [N ] and any s−i ∈ S−i, there exists a poly(|E|, N, q, {|Ti|}i∈[N ])-
time procedure which generates a strategy si ∈ Si and the corresponding (η, η)-estimation
Ĉi(si, s−i) of the individual costs such that Ĉi(si, s−i) ≤ % · η · Ci(s′i, s−i) for any s′i ∈ Si.
This means in particular that si is an ABR of i to s−i with approximation parameter % · ηη.4
Employing the procedure promised by Lemma 3, Bayes-ABRD simulates an ABRD of at
most R rounds s0, s1, . . . for the BGND game induced by I. Here R is a positive integer
depending on the tuple (λ, µ,K, η, η), and its exact value is also deferred to the following
parts (Sec. 5). The ABRD simulated in our algorithm is done as follows.
Each player i chooses her initial strategy s0i by taking each s0i (ti) to be the action generated
by OP for type ti with respect to the weight vector w0 defined by setting w0(e) =
∑
j∈[q] ξe,j ,
that is, as if i is playing alone. The obtained strategy s0i is broadcast by player i to all the
other players such that the full strategy profile s0 is known by every player. Assuming that
sr−1, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, was already constructed and known by all the players, sr is obtained as
follows. Every player i ∈ [N ] employs the procedure promised by Lemma 3 to generate an
ABR ŝ r−1i to sr−1−i , and computes ∆ri = Ĉi(sr−1)− (ηη) · Ĉi(ŝ r−1i , sr−1−i ). Both the strategy
ŝ r−1i and the value ∆ri are broadcast to all the other players. If ∆ri ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [N ],
then the ABRD stops, and every player i sets sri = sr−1i ; in this case, we say that the
ABRD converges. Otherwise, fix ∆r =
∑
i∈[N ] ∆ri and choose some player i′ ∈ [N ] so that
∆ri′ > 0 and ∆ri′ ≥ 1N∆r to update her strategy, setting sr = (ŝ r−1i′ , sr−1−i′ ) (the existence
of such a player is guaranteed by the pigeonhole principle, and ties are always broken by
choosing the player with the smallest index). Such an update can be performed by each
4 All subsequent occurrences of the term ABR (and ABRD) share the same approximation parameter
%ηη, hence we may refrain from mentioning this parameter explicitly.
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player in a distributed manner, as every player has the knowledge of the full vectors {sri }i∈[N ]
and {∆ri }i∈[N ]. When the ABRD terminates (either because it has reached round r = R or
because it converges), Bayes-ABRD outputs the strategy generated in the last round.
I Remark. Note that Bayes-ABRD is designed for computing the strategy profile, not for
invoking the strategies to decide the actions in real-time. All the operations of Bayes-ABRD,
including broadcasting the strategy ŝ r−1i and the value ∆ri for every player i in every round
r ∈ [R], are carried out in a “precomputing stage” without seeing the realized type profile.
The decision making that happens in real-time does not involve any further communication.
5 Analysis Sketch
Using the property of smoothness parameters, our analysis first gives the upper bound on
the BCR with the tuple (λ, µ,K, η, η) of parameters.5
I Theorem 4. Let Q = 2(ηη)N1−%(ηη)2µ . If R =
⌈
Q · ln (KNαmax−1)⌉, then the output sout of
Bayes-ABRD satisfies C(sout) ≤ 2K%(ηη)
2λ
1−%(ηη)2µ · Et∼T
[
OPT(t)
]
.
Next, we consider the case where the parameters %, η and η are fixed, and focus on
finding proper smoothness parameters (λ, µ) such that the BGND game is (λ, µ)-smooth
with µ < 1/[%(ηη)2]. For any µ′ ∈ (0, 1%(ηη)2 ), define gµ′(x) = (x + 1)αmax−1 − µ′ · xαmax
and h(x) =
[
(αmax − 1)(x + 1)αmax−2
]/[
αmax · xαmax−1
]
. Define γz′ to be the unique
positive root of (x + 1)z′−1 = xz′ for any z′ ≥ 1 [2]. Let µα = h
(
%(ηη)2 · γαmax
)
, and
λα = gµα
(
%(ηη)2 · γαmax
)
. Then we have the following result on the smoothness.
I Theorem 5. The BGND game is (λα, µα)-smooth, and %(ηη)2µα < 1− 1/αmax.
We then proceed to prove that the BGND game admits a potential function that is
K-bounded with K = dαmaxe.
I Theorem 6. For the BGND game, there exists a potential function Φ(s) that satisfies
Φ(s) ≤ C(s) ≤ dαmaxe · Φ(s) for any strategy profile s.
Now it remains to compute and analyze the (η, η)-estimation of the expected cost shares.
For any z ∈ (0, 1) and z′ ≥ 1, define bz =
(
(β◦)2 + 1
)(
1− 1β◦
)−z with β◦ being the unique
root of 2β3 − (z + 2)β2 − 2 = 0 in the interval (1,+∞), and Bz′ to be the fractional Bell
number with the parameter z′ [6, 28]. Our analysis utilizes the following propositions.
I Lemma 7 ([8]). Let {X1, X2, · · · , Xk, · · · } be a finite set of mutually independent random
variables following the Bernoulli distribution supported on {0, 1}. Then for any z ≥ 1,
E
[(∑
kXk
)z] ≤ Bz ·max{E[∑kXk], (E[∑kXk])z} .
I Lemma 8. Let {X1, X2, · · · , Xk, · · · } be a finite set of Bernoulli random variables that are
mutually independent. For any z′ ∈ (0, 1), 1bz′ ≤ E
[(
1 +
∑
kXk
)z′]
≤
(
E
[
1 +
∑
kXk
])z′
.
5 The proof of Theorem 4 bears similarity to the analysis in [33, 15]. Hence it is deferred to the attached
full version. The main differences between that proof of Theorem [33, 15] are discussed in Sec. 3.
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For each action ai of player i and each resource e, denote the indicator of whether e is
contained in ai by δ(ai, e). Formally,
δ(ai, e) =
{
0 if e /∈ ai
1 otherwise
.
I Theorem 9. For any player i, any edge e, any action ai, and any strategies s−i, let
f̂i,e(+; s−i) =
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
ti′∈Ti′
pi′(ti′)δ
(
si′(ti′), e
)]αj−1
, (4)
then f̂i,e(+;s−i)
max
{
1,maxj:αj∈(1,2) bαj−1
} ≤ fi,e(+; s−i) ≤ f̂i,e(+; s−i) · {1, maxj:αj≥2Bαj−1}.
Sketch of Proof. Let ai be an action in Ai satisfying e ∈ ai. By definition, we have
fi,e(+; s−i) = Et−i∼p−i
[
fi,e(ai, s−i(t−i))
]
=
∑
j∈[N ]
ξe,j · Et−i∼p−i
[(
lai,s−i(t−i)e
)αj−1]
=
∑
j∈[N ]
ξe,j · Et−i∼p−i
[(
1 +
∑
i′∈[N ]:i′ 6=i
δ(si′(t−i(i′)), e)
)αj−1]
=
∑
j∈[N ]
ξe,jE{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
δ(si′(ti′), e)
)αj−1]
.
The last transition holds because the prior distribution p is assumed to be a product
distribution.
Now define a finite set of mutually independent Bernoulli random variables {Xi′,e(s)}i′ 6=i
such that each Xi′,e(s) takes the value 1 with probability
∑
ti′ :e∈si′ (ti′ ) pi′(ti′). Then it can
be inductively proved that
E{ti′∼pi′}i′ 6=i
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
δ(si′(ti′), e)
)αj−1] = E[(1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
)αj−1]
.
Recall that the constant 1 in the last expression above can also be viewed as a Bernoulli
random variable which equals to 1 with probability 1. For every αj ≥ 2, Lemma 7 gives
E
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
)αj−1] ≤Bαj−1 ·max {E[1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
]
,
(
E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
])αj−1}
=Bαj−1 ·
(
E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
])αj−1
.
The second line holds because E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
]
> 1. Similarly, it can be derived from
Lemma 8 that for every αj ∈ (1, 2),
E
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
)αj−1] ≤ (E[1 +∑
i′ 6=i
Xi′,e(s)
])αj−1
,
which also trivially holds for αj = 1. So, E
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
)αj−1] ≤
max
{
1, maxj:αj≥2Bαj−1
}(
E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
])αj−1
, and in a similar way, it also be
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inferred from Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 that E
[(
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
)αj−1] ≥ (E[1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
])αj−1/
max
{
1,maxj:αj<2 bαj−1
}
. Since E
[
1 +
∑
i′ 6=iXi′,e(s)
]
= 1 +∑
i′ 6=i
∑
ti′
pi′(ti′)δ
(
si′(ti′), e
)
, this proposition holds. J
Theorem 9 shows that for any i ∈ [N ], e ∈ E and any s−i, there exists a
(max{1,maxαj∈(1,2) bαj−1}, max{maxαj≥2Bαj−1, 1})-estimation f̂i,e(+; s−i) of fi,e(+; s−i),
and the following proposition indicates that such an estimation can be obtained in
poly(q,N, {|Ti|}i∈[N ])-time.
I Corollary 10. By computing Eq. (4), the desired estimation of each expected cost share is
obtained in O(q ·∑i∈[N ] |Ti|)-time.
Plugging Theorem 5, Theorem 6, Theorem 9, and Corollary 10 into Theorem 4 proves
our main result, Theorem 2.
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